

## Message Text

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ACTION IO-13

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8644

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN 3219

STADIS//////////

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, UNGA, KS, KN

SUBJECT: KOREAN ISSUE AT 31ST UNGA

REF: STATE 201236

FOLLOWING MESSAGE GEARED TO PARAS OF REFTTEL.

1. (A) ALTHOUGH IT IS NOT POSSIBLE AS YET TO BE  
CONFIDENT, IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT THE PROSPECTS FOR SOME  
FORM OF DEFERMENT MOVE IN THE GENERAL COMITE WOULD BE  
FAVORABLE. (COMPOSITION OF GENERAL COMITE STILL NOT CERTAIN  
AND SOME OF THE STILL UNFILLED SEATS MAY BE CRITICAL.)  
THIS TENTATIVE ESTIMATE IS BASED ON LIKELIHOOD OF FOLLOWING  
AFFIRMATIVE VOTES FOR SUCH A MOVE: FRANCE, UK, US,  
AUSTRALIA, TURKEY, JAPAN, NICARAGUA, DOMIN. REPUBLIC,  
LESOTHO, FRG, AND POSSIBLE BOLIVIA (IF ON COMITE), OMAN  
(IF ON COMITE), PHILIPPINES (IF ON COMITE) AND IRAN  
(IF ON COMITE). OUR PRELIMINARY ESTIMATE IS THAT OTHER SIDE  
WOULD BE UNLIKELY BE ABLE MARSHAL MORE THAN 10 VOTES  
AGAINST DEFERRAL MOVE.

WE ARE NOT ABLE AT THIS TIME TO MAKE A MEANINGFUL  
ESTIMATE ON THE LIKELIHOOD OF SUCH A MOVE WITHSTANDING  
A CHALLENGE IN THE PLENARY. FURTHER EVIDENCE OF CONCLUSIONS,  
GENERAL ATMOSPHERICS AND COMMENTARY OF MODERATES IN  
COLOMBO WILL BE NECESSARY BEFORE IT IS POSSIBLE TO ATTEMPT  
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A MEANINGFUL PRELIMINARY ESTIMATE. GENERAL PRACTICE

OF PLENARY APPROVAL OF RECOMMENDATIONS OF GENERAL COMITE AUGERS WELL FOR SUSTAINING DEFERRAL RECOMMENDATION, BUT STRONG DEMAND BY SUPPORTERS OF NORTH KOREA TO HAVE THE ISSUE DISCUSSED COULD BE VERY HARD TO RESIST, SINCE MANY "NEUTRALS" TEND TO BE UNWILLING TO DENY ANY SUCH REQUEST (OUR CHANCES OF SUCCESS WOULD BE THE GREATER IF ASEAN STATES ARE PREPARED TO GET OUT IN FRONT ON SUCH A MOVE). A DEFEAT IN PLENARY OF DEFERRAL WOULD BE A SERIOUS PSYCHOLOGICAL BLOW. WE CONSEQUENTLY WOULD RECOMMEND AGAINST LAUNCHING SUCH A MOVE UNLESS THE CHANCES OF SUCCESS SEEM SIGNIFICANTLY BETTER THAN 50-50. WE SHOULD OF COURSE, HOWEVER, BE READY TO DEFEND ANY PLENARY MOVE TO DEFERRAL.

WE PRESUME DEPT'S QUESTION ON COMMITTEE 1 MOVE CONCERNING DEFERMENT DOES NOT RELATE TO MOVE STEMMING FROM PLENARY ACTION BASED ON GENRAL COMITE RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING DEFERRING INSCRIPTION, SINCE COMITE 1 HAS NO ROLE TO PLAY IN THIS PROCESS, BUT, RATHER, SEPARATE PROCEDURAL MOVE IN COMITE WHEN ITEM COMES UP FOR DEBATE. IN ORDER TO MAKE INTELLIGENT GUESS ON SUCH A PROCEDURE, WE WOULD NEED TO KNOW THE ABOVE INFOR FROM COLOMBO AS WELL AS A BETTER SENSE OF THE ATMOSPHERE IN NEW YORK AS THE TIME DRAWS NEAR. FOR THE MOMENT, ALL WE CAN SAY IS THAT WE ARE NOT IN A POSITION TO RECOMMEND RELIANCE ON ANY FORM OF DEFERRAL MOVE, BUT BELIEVE IT IS OUR MOST APPEALING RESULT AND SUFFICIENTLY POSSIBLE OF ACHIEVEMENT TO CONTINUE TO BEAR IN MIND.

1(B) THE PROS AND CONS OF PRIORITY ARE CLOSELY BALANCED. THE MAIN BENEFIT OF PRIORITY IS THAT IT WILL MAXIMIZE OUR PROTECTION AGAINST AN EFFORT TO CUT OFF VOTING AFTER HOSTILE RES IS ADOPTED, AND IT WILL AVOID HAVING OUR RES VOTED UPON IN A CIRCUMSTANCE IN WHICH THERE MAY SEEM TO BE BANDWAGON GOING THE OTHER WAY. (PRIORITY WLD NOT GIVE US ANY ADDITIONAL VOTES BUT IF FRIENDLY RES VOTED ON AFTER ADOPTION OF HOSTILE RES THER MIGHT BE SLIPPAGES FROM YES TO ABSTENTION AND ABSTENTION TO NO IF HOSTILE RES IS ADOPTED BY AN IMPRESSIVE MAJORITY.) ON THE OTHER HAND, WE THINK IT DOUBTFUL, IN LIGHT OF RECENT PRACTICE IN THIS CONNECTION, THAT HOSTILE SIDE CLD SUCCEED WITH EFFORT TO BLOCK VOTING ON FRIENDLY RES

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EVEN THOUGH POLISH CHAIRMAN WILL PRESUMABLY HELP THEM AS MUCH AS HE DARES. MOVEOVER, GREAT HESITANCY BY CANADA, NETH, AND N.Z. MAY NOT BE MERE LACK OF TOUGHMINDEDNESS, BUT AN ACCURATE REFLECTION OF HOW MANY OF OUR SOFTER SUPPORTERS WILL VIEW A MOVE FOR PRIORITY, I.E., AS INCONSISTENT WITH OUR STATEMENTS THAT WE DO NOT SEEK CONFRONTATION. FACT THAT OTHER SIDE HAS CLEARLY REJECTED OUR EFFORTS MAY NOT SEEM PERSUASIVE TO

SOME OF THIS CROWD, HOWEVER OBVIOUS IT MAY SEEM TO US, ROK, JAPAN, UK AND A FEW OTHER TOUGHMINDED FRIENDS. IF, MOREOVER, CANADA, COSTA RICA, NETH AND N.Z. ARE DRAFFED ALONG AGAINST THEIR WILL, THEY MAY NOT BE PREPARED TO WORK WITH US TO WIDEN OUR BASE. A LIST OF CO-SPONSORS DRASTICALLY SHORTER THAN LAST YEAR MAY TURN OUT TO BE SEEN AS A SIGN OF WEAKNESS.

1 (C) WE BELEIVE THAT ANY CLEAR PUBLIC INDICATION THAT OTHER SIDE WILL MAKE A CONCRETE MOVE (I.E., CONTINGENCIES 1,2, OR 3) MAKES A MOVE FOR PRIORITY BY OUR SIDE A MARGINALLY PREFERABLE ONE.

WHILE RISKS OF CUTTING OFF VOTING AFTER ADOPTION OF HOSTILE RES ARE NOT GREAT, CONSEQUENCES OF SUCH A MOVE, IF SUCCESSFUL, ARE SUFFICIENTLY SEVERE TO MERIT TAKING ADVANTAGE OF SUCH PROTECTION AS IS AFFORDED BY OBTAINING PRIORITY. OUR SLIGHT INCLINATION IN THIS DIRECTION IS, OF COURSE, RE-ENFORCED BY STRENGTH OF ROK DESIRE FOR PRIORITY AND ARGUMENTS CONTAINED IN SEOUL'S 5986 FOR PRIORITY IF THINGS GO BADLY. (JAPANESE CLEARLY GIVE CONSIDERABLE WEIGHT TO LATTER POINT). WE WOULD, HOWEVER, WISH TO NOTE THAT THE PRIORITY WE OBTAIN BY GOING IN FIRST CAN BE REVERSED BY THE 1ST COMITE, AND BELIEVE A PARTICULARLY SIGNIFICANT RISK OF REVERSAL WLD EXIST UNDER OPTION 3.

WE CONSEQUENTLY RECOMMEND THAT WE TAKE POSITION AT AUG 16 MEETING OF FAVORING MOVE FOR PRIORITY IF ALL OR ALL BUT ONE OF CORE GROUP WILLING TO CO-SPONSOR INITIAL MOVE AND GO TO WORK SEEKING ADDITIONAL CO-SPONSOR ASAP.  
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